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PROCEDURAL PROGRESS IN WASHINGTON
MILTON D. GREEN*

T

WO great accomplishments mark the course of procedural reform
in the United States. One is the David Dudley Field Code of Civil
Procedure of 1848. It eliminated the distinction between law and equity,
abolished the common law forms of action, and simplified pleading. This
code, first enacted in New York, served as a model fo similar legislation in a majority of the states.' Washington enacted its version of the
Field Code in 1854.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be regarded as the second
great landmark. These rules were drafted by a committee of experts,
headed by the Honorable William D. Mitchell, and were promulgated
by the Supreme Court in 1938. They standardized procedure in the
federal district courts, incorporated the fundamental reforms of the
Field Code, further simplified procedure by remedying the defects
which had become apparent after ninety years' experience under the
code, and provided for the most comprehensive pre-trial discovery
yet devised. As in the case of the code, these rules have served as a
model for procedural reform in a number of the states.'
In January of this year the Washington Supreme Court authorized
the publication of volume 34-A (second series) of the Washington
Reports. This is the first hyphenated volume of the reports; it is the
first volume which contains no cases; it is the first volume which brings
together, in one convenient book, all of the rules of the Supreme Court
*Professor of Law, University of Washington; member of the Washington Bar.
1 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 23 et seq. (2d ed. 1947).
2 Some states such as Colorado have discarded their codes and substituted therefor
rules of civil procedure patterned after the new federal rules. Other states have adopted
portions of the rules without attempting a full scale reform.
87
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regulating procedure in and out of the Supreme Court, unencumbered
by extraneous material. It is not the format, however, but the contents
of the volume which tend to make it a landmark in the history of
procedural reform in the state of Washington.
In this new set of rules the Supreme Court did not make a full scale
adoption of the federal rules, but it did borrow generously from them,
and it also made significant innovations "on its own." Washington
lawyers will be faced with the problem of relearning a substantial portion of the adjective law of the state. This will not be an entirely new
experience. Lawyers have become inured to the biennial task of integrating the results of new legislation with their previous store of
legal knowledge. They have also become accustomed to rather frequent
changes in the rules of court. The first rules of our Supreme Court
were adopted July 15, 1901;' since then they have been revised or
amended twenty-two times.4 In 1925 the legislature delegated to the
Supreme Court plenary power to prescribe rules of procedure.' Pursuant thereto, on January 14, 1927, the Supreme Court promulgated
its Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure; 6 since then they have
been revised or amended seven times.' Pursuant to the same legislative
authority, on August 1, 1938, the Supreme Court adopted another set
of rules denominated the General Rules of the Superior Courts; 8 since
then they have been revised or amended twice.'
In writing the present article the author has in mind no more
ambitious purpose than to indicate exactly what changes have been
made by the new rules in the hope that by so doing he may save the
members of the bar some time, energy, and temper."0
325 Wash. xxvii (1901).
4Apr. 17, 1909, 51 Wash. xxxiii; Dec. 9, 1911, 63 Wash. xxxi; June 8, 1913, 71
Wash. xxxix; Dec. 30, 1914, 81 Wash. xxxii; Feb. 18, 1915, 82 Wash. xxxvii; Nov. 5,
1923, 124 Wash. xxxvii; Oct. 11, 1927, 143 Wash. xxxii; Mar. 15, 1929, 150 Wash.
xxxvii; Apr. 1. 1931, 159 Wash. xxxiii; Jan. 1, 1933, 169 Wash. xxx; Mar. 1, 1935, 178
Wash. xxxv; Jan. 1, 1937, 186 Wash. xxxiii; Aug. 1, 1938, 193 Wash. xxxi; June 3, 1941,
6 Wn.(2d) xv; July 1, 1942, 11 Wn.(2d) xv; July 19, 1943, 15 Wn.(2d) xvii; July
30, 1943, 16 Wn.(2d) xv; Nov. 23, 1943, 17 Wn.(2d) xv; Mar. 2, 1944, 18 Wn.(2d)
3-a; Oct. 22, 1945, 23 Wn.(2d) xvii; Sept. 27, 1949, 32 Wn.(2d) xvii; Jan. 2, 1951,
Vol. 34-A Wn.(2d).
5 Wash. Laws Extraordinary Session 1925, c. 118.
6 140 Wash. xxxv (1926).
7 Oct. 17, 1930, 157 Wash. xxxi; Mar. 1, 1935, 178 Wash. xxxvii; Aug. 1, 1938,
193 Wash. 39-a; July 1, 1942, 11 Wn.(2d) xviii; Dec. 11, 1943, 17 Wn.(2d) xvii;
Mar. 2, 1944, 18 Wn.(2d) 31-a; Jan. 2, 1951, 34-A Wn.(2d).
8 193 Wash. 55-a (1938).
9 Mar. 2, 1944, 18 Wn.(2d) 51-a; Jan. 2, 1951, 34-A Wn.(2d).
10 The present article deals only with the rules on appeal; the rules of pleading.

practice, and procedure; and the general rules of the Superior Courts. Vol. 34-A
Win. (2d) also includes rules peculiar to the business of the Supreme Court, a code of
professional ethics, a code of judicial ethics, rules for admission to practice, and rules
for the discipline of attorneys.
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RULES ON APPEAL

Before the present revision it was necessary, as every attorney
knows, to refer not only to the rules of the Supreme Court, but also
to the statutes, in appealing a case. The primary purpose of the revision,
according to the preface to the volume, was to bring together in one
place all of the material dealing with appellate practice. In so doing
the Supreme Court also undertook a certain amount of streamlining and
simplification. A bird's-eye view of the degree of change effected by
the new rules on appeal may be obtained by referring to the following
table:"
Rule
1

Source

15
16
17

Remington 1754
New
Old rule 28
Remington 1730-7
Remington 1748
Old rule 24
New
New
New
Old rule 17
Old rule 18
Old rule 19
Old rule 25
Remington 1716 and
2183-1
Remington 1731
Remington 1737
Remington 1736

18
19
20
21
22

Remington
Old rule 7
Remington
Remington
Remington

23

Old rule 6

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

14

1717
1735
1743
1721

Degree of change, if any
Substantially same
Substantially same
Substantially same
Same, except it deletes last sentence
No change

Similar to Remington 150
No change
Substantially same
No change
No change
Substantially same
Slight change in terminology
Last sentence added
Rule embodies only first sentence
of statute
No change
No change
No change
Substantially same
Substantially same, except it changes
time from five to ten days
No change

"1The comparison in this and other tables is with the 1944 edition, found in 18
Wn. (2d), and also published by the Bar Association in pamphlet form.
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Rule

Source
Remington 1723
Remington 1722
Remington 1725
Remington 1726
Remington 1730-9
Remington 1728
Remington 1727
Remington 1739
New
Old rule 5
Old rules 9 and 10
Remington 388
Remington 389
Remington 391
Remington 392
Remington 396
Remington 394
Old rule 11
Old rule 16
Old rule 21
Old rule 8
Old rule 13
Old rule 12
New
Remington 1749
Old rule 20
Old rule 22
Remington 1733
Remington 1734
Old rule 26
Old Rule 27
Remington 1744 and
old rule 23
Old rule 29
Old rule 30
New

Degree of change, if any
No change
No change
No change
Substantially same
No change
Same, except for last sentence of rule
No change
No change

Substantial change
Slight changes
Substantially same
Substantially same
Substantially same
Substantially same
Substantially same
Substantially same
Material changes
Material changes
Slight change
No change, except a clarifying
cross-reference
No change
Material changes
No change
Same, except one sentence has been
added
Slight change
Substantially same
Substantially same
Minor changes
No change
Substantially same
Slight addition
Minor changes
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Rule
59
60
61
62
63
64

Source
Remington 1751
Remington 1741
Remington 1742
Remington 1738
Remington 1752
Remington 1724

Degree of change, if any
No change
Substantially same
No change
Minor change
Substantially same
No change

By and large there has been little significant change in the appellate
process. Of the sixty-four rules, fifty-two merely reenact pre-existing
law verbatim, or with minor modifications. Seven of the sixty-four
rules are new, and five contain major changes.
The rules which I have listed as "new" are not necessarily significant
innovations, but are "new" in the sense that they have never before
appeared in the rules or statutes governing appeals. They may be disposed of in a few words. Rule 2 consists of a list of definitions. Rule 7
advises the bar that sanctions may be imposed for violations. Rule 8
advises the bar that any civil or criminal case will be dismissed for
noncompliance with jurisdictional requirements. This is merely declaratory of present practice. Rule 9 is similar to Remington 150 and deals
merely with computation of time where Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays
are involved. Rule 32 lists the jurisdictional steps which an appellant
must take in order to perfect an appeal. It is pehaps well to have these
emphasized in a specific rule. However, the rule is merely declaratory
of former practice. Rule 47 permits the Chief Justice to authorize an
appeal in forma pauperisin criminal cases. Rule 58 concerns itself with
the title of all cases under review, with particular reference to formal
paper requirements in cases of writs of certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition.
We turn now to the rules which embody changes, additions, or
deletions, which are more than mere changes in form. Rule 5, which
states that "personal appearance of any party in the Supreme Court
hall not be necessary on appeal in either civil or criminal actions," is
exactly the same as Remington 1748 except that the last sentence of
said statute is deleted. That sentence reads "In criminal actions the
defendant shall be entitled to close the argument." The writer is unable
to determine whther this deletion (1) was inadvertent, (2) was intended to leave the last sentence of Remington 1748 in force, (3) was
intended to change pre-existing practice, or (4) was intended to leave
the matter to be governed by unwritten law.
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Rule 16 defines the powers of the Supreme Court and is identical
with Remington 1737. However, it goes further and adds one more sentence: "Respondent may present and urge claimed errors by the trial
court in instructions and rulings which, if repeated on a new trial, would
constitute prejudicial error." If this new sentence means that a respondent need not prosecute a cross appeal as prescribed by Rule 33
in order to review alleged errors of the trial court, it is significant.
Otherwise it is merely declaratory of previous practice by which the
Supreme Court exercised authority to review cross errors properly
alleged on cross appeal.
Rule 17 states, "Upon an appeal from a judgment, the Supreme
Court will review any intermediate order or determination of the
superior court which involves the merits and materially affects the
judgment, appearing on the record sent from the superior court." This
is the first sentence of Remington 1736. However, Remington 1736
goes on to provide that where the appeal is from a trial to the court,
or by a referee in either legal or equitable cases, the Supreme Court
may review the law and the facts de novo. It is difficult to understand
why the Supreme Court did not incorporate in Rule 17 the provisions
of Remington 1736, giving the court the power to review de novo cases
tried to the court without a jury, a power which the court has felt no
hesitation in exercising. Perhaps the court felt that it was unnecessary
to spell out this power of the court, which it may have deemed inherent.
Perhaps by not modifying or mentioning that portion of Remington
1736 the Supreme Court intended for it to remain in force as a statute.
However, this would be contrary to the avowed purpose of the rules as
stated in the preface or introduction. If, on the other hand, the Supreme
Court intended to abdicate its power to review de novo cases tried to
the court (which seems inconceivable), this would be indeed a significant change.
Rule 22, concerning appeal bonds, is the same as Remington 1721
except that time within which the bond may be filed is extended from
five to ten days from the notice of appeal.
Rule 29, concerning an application for a new bond where the respondent believes the old one has become insufficient, departs slightly
from Remington 1728 which permitted evidence to be adduced before
the Supreme Court. The new rule provides that upon the hearing of the
motion the court may require the trial court to examine into the merits
of the motion and the adequacy of the bond, and certify the facts and
conclusions to the Supreme Court.
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Rule 33, dealing with appeals and cross appeals in civil causes,
differs materially from old Rule 5. The maximum time for serving
notice of appeal from a final judgment remains the same at thirty days,
and from an interlocutory appealable order at fifteen days. However,
under old Rule 5 service of the notice could be upon the party or his
attorney, whereas under Rule 33 service must be upon -"opposing
counsel." In regard to cross appeals, old Rule 5 provided that if the
notice of appeal is from a final judgment and is served on the last three
days of the time permitted, any respondent has five days thereafter for
his cross appeal. Under Rule 33 it is provided that each respondent and
co-party, who did not join in the original notice, may within ten days

after the giving of the original notice, if made orally, or the service
thereof, if in writing, file and serve on each party or his attorney a
notice of cross appeal. Under old Rule 5 there was an alternative
method of giving notice of appeal, to wit, notice given in open court or
at chambers when the judgment was rendered or within three days
thereafter by filing with the clerk written notice of appeal. Under Rule
33 the alternative method of giving oral notice in open court is retained,
but the time is changed from three to five days after entry of the
judgment within which notice may be given to the clerk with the same
effect as if it was given orally. Under old Rule 5, if this method was
pursued, the appeal bond must have been filed at the time of giving the
notice or within two days thereafter. Under Rule 33 the appeal bond
must be filed at the time the notice is given or within five days thereafter. Rule 33 also contains a provision that in appeals from orders
denying writs of habeas corpus no appeal bond shall be required.
Rule 34, dealing with the settlement of the statement of facts, makes
several changes. At common law the usual way of getting the facts and
proceedings at the trial into the appellate record was by means of a
bill of exceptions properly certified by the trial judge.12 From early
days in Washington up to the advent of the present new rules the
statutes, rules and decisions referred to a bill of exceptions or statement
of facts, using the two terms more or less interchangeably. The -new
rules abandon the bill of exceptions and confine themselves to a statement of facts. From now on out it seems that the term "bill of exceptions" will be pass6 in Washington. This makes for clarity because
there was no clean-cut distinction between the two terms.' The second
12 See HOLDSWoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
RA yoD,
BULL OF EXCEPTIONS (T. and J. W. Johnson,

222 et seq. (3rd ed. 1922);
Philadelphia, 1848).

Is See SMILEY, A TREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS AND STATEMENTS OF FACTS
(Bancroft-Whitney Co., 1912).
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change which Rule 34 makes is quite significant. Under the old rule
the appellant had ninety days from the date of the entry of the final
judgment to tender and file his proposed bill of exceptions or statement
of facts. In a long line of decisions the Supreme Court held that this
time limitation was absolutely jurisdictional. and could not be extended
by the court or by stipulation of the parties. 4 The one exception was
in cases where the death penalty had been imposed." Under the new
rules, the filing of the proposed statement o I facts with the clerk of the
superior court within ninety days from the entry of the final judgment
is still regarded as jurisdictional, but there is a proviso that the superior
court or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may extend the time
not to exceed thirty days for good cause.
This increased flexibility under Rule 34 is a desirable change and
will undoubtedly take care of most of the hardship cases. It may not
be sufficient to prevent an occasional miscarriage of justice. There may
be future cases like Wheeler v. S. Burch & Sons, 6 where immediately
after the judgment became final counsel for the plaintiff (who was
nonsuited) ordered the transcript of testimony from the reporter, paid
him $250 down, and kept hounding him for it daily. However, due to
a court reporters' strike, it was not completed for filing within time.
In that case twenty-five Seattle lawyers appeared for the plaintiff and
fourteen more as amici curiae, asking the court not to strike the bill of
exceptions because the fault was solely due to the machinery of the
court, the reporter being an officer of the court. In that case the
Supreme Court assumed arguendo that the plaintiff's excuse was perfect, but said the rule was jurisdictional, admitting of no exceptions
save where the death penalty had been pronounced. The appeal was
dismissed. It is submitted that this type of situation should not be
permitted to occur.
Rule 41, dealing with the serving and filing of briefs on appeal,
makes significant changes from old Rule 11. Under the old rule the
appellant had ninety days "after an appeal shall have been taken by
notice" within which to serve and file his briefs. Note that the time
14 For recent representative cases, see Woodard v. Kuhn, 32 Wn. (2d)
96, 200
P.(2d) 739 (1948) ; Black v. Porter, 31 Wn.(2d) 664, 198 P.(2d) 670 (1948) ; Smith
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 30 Wn. (2d) 901, 193 P.(2d) 856 (1948) ;
Falk v. Steinback, 30 Wn.(2d) 62, 190 P.(2d) 747 (1948) ; State ex rel. Grange v.
Riddell, 27 Wn. (2d) 134, 177 P. (2d) 78 (1947) ; Colasurdo v. Colasurdo, 27 Wn. (2d)
860, 181 P.(2d) 172 (1947) ; Martell v. Raymond, 11 Wn.(2d) 165, 118 P.(2d) 950
(1941) ; Bennett v. McKellips, 8 Wn.(2d) 176, 111 P.(2d) 558 (1941) ; McKasson v.
Huntworth, 5 Wn.(2d) 661, 105 P.(2d) 44 (1940).
'5 State v. Brown, 26 Wn.(2d) 857, 176 P.(2d) 293 (1947).
1627 Wn.(2d) 325, 178 P.(2d) 331 (1947).
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was ninety days and ran from the notice of appeal. Under the new rule
it is provided that "within thirty days after the statement of facts shall
have been filed ...

or in those cases in which a statement of facts is

not necessary in order to review a cause, within thirty days after the
giving or service of notice of appeal, the appellant shall" serve and file
his briefs. This is a significant time change which, if not carefully
noted, may be a trap for the unwary. Under the new rule the time is
only thirty days and runs from the filing of the statement of facts, if
one has been filed. If no statement of facts is necessary and the appeal
is on the common law record, then the time is only thirty days and
runs from the service of the notice of appeal. In this latter situation
the new rule cuts down on the time for filing briefs from ninety to thirty
days. Under the new rule time for filing the reply brief is extended
from ten to twelve days.
Rule 42, dealing with the contents and style of briefs, makes several
changes. Subsection 1 (c) is new. It specifies the format of typewritten
briefs. Subsection 1 (e) is the same as the old rule except it requires
filing of ten copies instead of six. Subsection 3, dealing with the contents of briefs, no longer requires that appellant's brief contain "a
statement of questions involved" nor that respondent's brief contain
"any counter-statement of questions involved, including restatement
and additional statement." The old rule, which required the statement
of questions involved, provided "The questions and answers in their
entirety should not ordinarily exceed one page and must never exceed
two pages." In the recent case of Trowbridge v. Clark,7 the respondents
complained of a violation of this rule. In discussing this contention the
Supreme Court stated that the rule has not been as helpful to the court
as it was hoped as the questions are always phrased so that there is
only one possible answer to them, and the rule is often violated as to
length. Apparently this thought prompted the entire deletion of the
requirement in the new rules.
Having deleted one requirement under the old rules as of doubtful
utility, Rule 42 proceeds immediately to impose a new one. Subsection
5 of Rule 42 is new. It provides that under the heading "statement of
the case" the appellant's brief shall set forth (1) a brief statement of
the nature of the action, (2) a short resume of the pleadings and proceedings, (3) the nature of the judgment and, when necessary for a
review thereof, the rulings and orders of the court, and (4) a clear and
1'137 Wash. Dec. 61, 219 P.(2d) 980 (1950).
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concise statement of the facts in the case in narrative form and any
other matters necessary to an understanding of the nature of the controversy on the appeal, with page references to the record. Under 5 (b)
the respondent in his brief is required to accept the statement of the
case in the appellant's brief or file a counter-statement of the case.
Subsection 6 of Rule 42, also new, provides that where the brief
refers to any portion of the record on appeal specific page references
must be given, that exhibits shall be referred to by letter or number,
and that if attention is drawn to opposing counsel's brief, page reference must be made.
Rule 43, dealing with the errors which the Supreme Court will consider, contains the following which is new: "In appeals from all actions
at law or in equity tried to the court without a jury, appellant must
point out by number and description the findings of fact upon which
he predicates error, otherwise the findings will be accepted as the
established facts in the case."
Rule 46, dealing with appeals in criminal cases, embodies substantial
changes. The opening paragraph is a clearer statement of the jurisdictional steps. Subsection 1 is clarified and enlarges the time of appeal in
a criminal case from five days to thirty days from the entry of the
judgment.
Subsection 2 makes two new additions, one providing that expense
of the appeal shall be borne by the county when it is prosecuted in
forma pauperis, and the other providing that either party may have
transmitted to the Supreme Court any additional portions of the
records and files believed to have a bearing on the case. Subsection 4
contains an added proviso that the superior court or the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court may extend for good cause the time for filing of
the proposed statement of facts not to exceed thirty days. This brings
the criminal procedure in line with the civil procedure on this point.
This subsection also contains a new provision to the effect that the certification of the statement of facts shall be completed within twenty
days of its filing, but further providing that this time may be extended
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or in his absence by any
judge of that court.
Subsection 5 of the rule is new but probably merely declares the
existing condition of affairs, to wit, that the certifying of the statement
of facts, the filing and service of the proposed statement of facts, and
all steps and proceedings leading up to it, shall be deemed proceedings
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in the cause itself resting upon the jurisdiction originally acquired by
the court in the cause.
Subsection 7, dealing with the filing of appellant's briefs, is materially different from the old rule. Under the old rule the briefs were to
be filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court within ninety days after
giving the notice of appeal. Under the new rule briefs are to be filed
with the clerk of the superior court within thirty days after the date
of the certifying of the statement of facts. On this point the nev rule
differs not only from the old practice but also from the civil practice
and will undoubtedly cause some confusion to attorneys until they are
familiar with it.
Subsection 11 of the rule also makes material changes from the old
rule which provided in substance that if upon the expiration of ninety
days after the giving of notice of appeal the record is not made or the
fee not paid as required by rule, the case could be dismissed. The new
rule provides that if upon the expiration of 170 days from the entry of
judgment, unless the time for certification of the statement of facts or
serving and filing of appellant's brief has been extended, the record is
not made, etc., the case may be dismissed. This 170 days apparently
contemplates the sum of the times given for the performance of all of
the jurisdictional steps by the appellant.
Subsection 12 of the rule is new. It provides, "In cases in which the
death penalty has been imposed this court will make such exceptions
to this rule as it determines will be just."
Rule 47 is new. It provides for appeals in criminal cases in forma
pauperis.
Rule 49 is the same as old Rule 20 except that it adds the following
sentence, "The time allowed for argument in cases wherein the death
penalty has been imposed is not limited."
Rule 50, dealing with petitions for rehearing, differs from old Rule
22 by deleting the requirement that "Twenty-five printed copies of the
petition shall be filed with the clerk," and providing in substitution
thereof, "Petitions for rehearing and answers thereto may be printed,
mimeographed, or typewritten. If a petition for rehearing be granted,
the court may require additional copies of the petition, answer and
briefs to be supplied in the manner indicated by the court."
Rule 56, dealing with habeas corpus, contains a new provision to the
effect that where the application is made by any person who by reason
of poverty is unable to pay the cost of such proceeding, the Chief
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Justice may order that it be prosecuted without the payment of costs.
Rule 62, which among other things provides that where the appeal
is taken merely for the purposes of delay the Supreme Court may
award damages, is the same as old Remington 1738 except that it
deletes the 15 per cent ceiling on the damages.
One of the avowed purposes of the new rules, as stated in the foreword, was to incorporate in the rules all of the provisions of law dealing
with appellate practice so that "in taking the necessary steps to perfect
an appeal, attorneys will not have to refer to other than this volume."
Pursuant to this plan, as the table of changes, supra will indicate,
the Supreme Court has put into the rules certain provisions which
formerly appeared in the statutes. However, there are some omissions.
In the foregoing discussion mention has been made of the fact that
Rule 5 embraces only a portion of Remington 1748 and that Rule 17
embraces only a portion of Remington 1736. What the legal status of
the remaining fragments of these statutes is, we do no know. In addition to these partial omissions the Supreme Court failed to incorporate
in the new rules or otherwise dispose of several whole sections of the
statutes bearing upon the subject of appellate practice: Remington
1720, dealing with who may join in a notice of appeal; Remington
1740, dealing with rehearings and remittitur; Remington 1745, dealing
with the effect of an appeal in a criminal action; Remington 1746,
dealing with the effective date of the commencement of a sentence in a
felony action where no appeal is taken; Remington 1747, dealing with
the question of bail during the pendency of appeal; and Remington
1750, dealing with the imprisonment of a defendant pending appeal.
Nor do the new rules contain anything covering the substance of Remington 390 to the effect that depositions and other written evidence on
file shall be appropriately referred to in the proposed bill or statement,
and when it is certified the same or copies thereof, if the judge so
directs, shall be attached to the bill or statement and shall thereupon
become a part thereof. Likewise the new rules are silent on the subject
matter of Remington 395 which covers what matters shall be included
in the common law record without the necessity of having the same
included in the bill of exceptions or statement of facts.
RULES OF PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

In 1925 the legislature granted to the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules of practice and procedure for the superior courts."
is Wash. Laws Extraordinary Session 1925, c. 118.
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This action was in line with the growing conviction that legislatures
are poorly equipped to prescribe rules of procedure for the courts and
that the job can better be done by the courts themselves 9 Pursuant to
this authority, in January, 1927, the Supreme Court promulgated the
first set of such rules." There have been several amendments since
then.2 1 The present set, which became effective in January of this year,
probably constitutes the most significant exercise of the Supreme
Court's rule-making power.
The following table will give a bird's-eye picture of the changes
effected by the new rules:
Rule
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Source
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule
Old rule

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
18
16
19
17
23
24
20
25

Degree of change, if any
No change
No change
No change
No change
Slight change
Slight change
This is merely last part of old
rule 6
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
Minor changes
No change
No change

See article by William D. Mitchell in DAvm

DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS

73 et seq. (New York University School of Law, 1949).
20 140 Wash. xxxv (1926).
21 See note 7 supra.
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Rule
24
25
26
27

Source
Old rule 26
Old rule 27
Federal rule
Federal rule

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Federal rule
Federal rule
Federal rule
Federal rule
Federal rule
Federal rule
Federal rule
Federal rule
Federal rule
Federal rule
Old rule 22
New
New
New
New
Federal rule

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

49

Degree of change, if any
No change
Minor change
Major change
Major change (of Remington
1249 et seq.)
Major change
Major change
Major change
Major change
Major change
Major change
Major change
Major change
Minor change
Major change
No change

Major change

You will note that, aside from renumbering (which may cause some
confusion) there are no significant changes until we get to Rule 26.
The New Discovery Procedure.In Rules 26 to 37 the Supreme Court
has adopted practically verbatim the federal rules governing the discovery process. Our new rules carry the same numbers as the federal
rules, which will be a great convenience to lawyers, since federal cases
interpreting the federal rules will be presumptively controlling the
interpretation of our own rules under standard principles of construction. Thus, although our discovery rules are new, they come to us with
a gloss of interpretative cases after more than twelve years' use in the
federal courts.
One of the features of the new federal rules which made them a
landmark in procedural reform in this country was the discovery
process. It has been referred to as the heart of the new federal rules. For centuries under our Anglo-American system of jurisprudence we
have been operating under what might be termed the adversary system
22 Van Cise, The Federal Discovery Practice Should be Adopted by All States, 24
WASH. L. REv. 21 (1949).
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of justice. The theory is that in litigation each party is represented by
counsel who battle for their respective clients in the judicial arena and
that if they strive mightily on the trial, when the dust of the combat
settles justice will emerge triumphant. The lawsuit was regarded as a
contest, a battle, a game between adversaries. No matter what the
theory was, as a matter of actual practice the adversaries were the
lawyers and not the clients. Hence the actual decision of the case too
frequently was based upon the skill and prowess of counsel and not
upon the true merits of the case. If counsel were equally matched, it
was a fairly safe bet to assume that the true merits of the controversy
would be decided. However, if counsel for one party was an experienced and wily practitioner, thoroughly familiar with all of the technicalities of litigation, and his opponent was a fledgling fresh out of
law school, it not infrequently happened that the fledgling was counted
out without knowing what had happened to him. The element of surprise was a strategic and tactical weapon recognized as part of the
armament of the lawyer in the trial of a lawsuit. Each lawyer attempted
to keep his opponent as much in the dark as possible, and if he could
spring a surprise on him at the trial and catch him unaware, so much
the better. True, the pleadings were supposed to apprise the parties of
the issues and the nature of the contest, but every experienced lawyer
knows that the pleadings do no such thing and that the real controversy
may be masked behind general and ambiguous allegations.
The federal rules undertook to eliminate as far as possible this
element of surprise in litigation. The objective was not, as in the past,
to award the decision as a prize to the cleverest lawyer but to arrive
at a just determination of the merits of the controversy. The process
by which this miracle was to be accomplished was the discovery procedure. Under it each party could find out in advance of trial practically everything about his opponent's case so that he could come into
court adequately prepared on the real issues and, if he had been
diligent in using the discovery process, he would not be taken by
surprise. In this way all of the pertinent facts concerning the case
would be brought out in the open and called to the attention of the
court or jury, and the real merits could be determined. By adopting
the federal discovery procedure our Supreme Court has taken this
philosophy to its bosom. Let us now make a quick survey of our new
rules relating to discovery.
Rule 26. Pre-trial depositions were not unknown in Washington prior
to the advent of present Rule 26. This state had the usual procedure
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for taking the depositions of witnesses where the evidence was to be
introduced at the trial and where the witness was apt to be unavailable.
These were not discovery depositions. Washington also had in old
Rule 7 a procedure for oral examination of an adverse party before
trial. This was indeed a discovery process, since the purpose of taking
the oral examination of the adverse party was to find out what his
case was about. Old Rule 7 was comparatively narrow in compass when
compared with new Rule 26. Under old Rule 7 only the adverse party
was subject to pre-trial examination, and the rule was silent as to the
scope of examination. Under new Rule 26 a pre-trial deposition may
be taken not only of the adverse party but of any witness. Concerning
the scope of the examination, the new rule provides that "The deponent
may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the claim
or defense of any other party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts. It is not ground for objection that the
testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."2 This is the key rule to the scope of pre-trial discovery.
To one unfamiliar or out of sympathy with the federal discovery procedure the implications of this rule are surprising, if not shocking.
Under it a lawyer can take a pre-trial deposition of the adverse
party and ask him everything he knows about the case, including the
names and addresses of all of his witnesses, and all about any real or
documentary evidence which the adverse party has in his possession
or intends to introduce at the trial. On this examination the lawyer
is not bound by the usual rules of evidence, and it is no ground of
objection that questions asked call for hearsay or answers which
would not be admissible under the normal rules of evidence. It is
sufficient if they call for information which might reasonably lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence. In other words, the rule consti23 The Washington Supreme Court added the following to its Rule 26 which is not
found in the federal rule: "The court need not order the production or inspection of
any writing obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor
or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial. The court shall not
order the production or inspection of any writing that reflects an attorney's mental
impressions, conclusions or legal theories, or, except as provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert." The Supreme Court was apparently unwilling to rely upon
judicial interpretation to take care of this situation, but see Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495 (1947).
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tutes a very frank invitation for a full-scale fishing expedition. After
the adverse party has been thoroughly processed and has told everything he knows about his own case, then the lawyer can proceed
methodically to take the pre-trial depositions of all the adverse party's
witnesses and find out everything they know about the case. Further,
he can employ other discovery machinery to look at the books, documents and real evidence, and then secure copies or photographs of it.
If a lawyer is diligent in the use of the machinery now at his disposal,
there is no excuse for his going into the actual trial in ignorance of
any material issue which may develop.
Of course the rule works both ways, since both parties are entitled
to employ the machinery. An interesting by-product of the use of the
discovery machinery has developed under the federal system. A great
number of cases are never tried at all. They are settled or dismissed
because, when the full facts are developed and made available to both
sides, actual litigation becomes fruitless.
Subsection (d) of Rule 26 specifies the uses to which the deposition
may be put. Where the deposition is taken solely for the purpose of
discovering facts about the opponent's case, the function is fulfilled
by the mere taking of the deposition. Of course copies may be procured
under Rule 30. However, the rule spells out other uses of the deposition. It may be used at the trial to contradict or impeach the witness;
it may be used at the trial for any purpose if it is the deposition of
the adverse party. If it is merely that of a witness it may be introduced
in evidence at the trial if the witness is dead; absent from the
county and more than twenty miles away; unable to attend because
of illness, age, infirmity, or imprisonment; not under subpoena through
no fault of the party calling him; or if exceptional circumstances
warrant it. Thus any deposition taken under the rules may be used for
the two-fold purpose of discovery and use on the trial for testimony.
Rule 27. This rule adopts the federal rule dealing with perpetuation
of testimony. Washington procedure for this purpose had previously
existed. 4 This rule, strictly speaking, does not deal with discovery,
and the change effected by the adoption of the federal rule is not a
seismic one. However, the new rule is more comprehensive and does
constitute an improvement over the old statute.
Rules 28, 29, 30, and 32. Rule 28 specifies the persons before whom
a deposition may be taken. Rule 29 provides that by stipulation the
parties may take a deposition before any person, at any time or place,
24 REM. REV. STAT.

§ 1249 et seq. [P. P. C. § 43-1 et seq.].
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upon any notice, and in any manner. Rule 30 deals with the mechanics
of taking an oral deposition and provides safeguards against abuses;
it also makes provisions for motions to terminate or limit the examination. Rule 32 deals with objections, errors, irregularities, and waiver.
Rule 3r. Before the adoption of new Rule 31 there was no procedure
in the state of Washington authorizing the taking of a pre-trial discovery deposition upon written interrogatories. Old Rule 7 provided
for oral examination before trial but restricted it to parties. Under
Rule 31 a pre-trial discovery deposition may be taken of any witness
upon written interrogatories.
Rule 33. Prior to the adoption of Rule 33 there was a procedure
in this state known as "interrogatories to parties.""5 Under it the plaintiff at the time of filing his complaint, or afterwards, and the defendant
at the time of filing his answer, or afterwards, could file interrogatories
with the clerk "for the discovery of facts and documents material to
the support or defense of the action, to be answered on oath by the
adverse party."
This statute looks very much like a tool for discovery before trial.
However, its looks are deceiving. It was passed in its present form by
the territorial legislature in 1854. It is merely a codification of the old
equity practice, a method by which a pleader obtained admissions in
support of his own case, not a tool for discovering what his opponent's
case might be about. In an unbroken line of authority, beginning with
Cully v. Northern Pacific Railroad,6 and perhaps ending with State
ex rel. Bronson v. Superior Court," the Supreme Court gives the statute
a very narrow interpretation, holding that interrogatories must be
limited to eliciting information in support of the case of the person
propounding them and cannot be used for a fishing expedition.
This history makes it clear that Rule 33 regarding interrogatories
to parties is indeed an innovation. It follows verbatim the federal rule
to the effect that any party may serve upon any adverse party written
interrogatories to be answered under oath. The scope of the interrogatories is specifically made as btoad as the scope of depositions under
Rule 26.
Rule 34. Prior to the new rule we had a statute" dealing with inspection of books and documents. It provided that the court may order a
party to permit the inspection and copying of "any book, document
REM. REv. STAT. § 1226 et seq. [P. P. C. § 42-3 et seq.].
26 35 Wash. 241, 77 Pac. 202 (1904).
27 194 Wash. 339, 77 P.(2d) 997 (1938).
28 REm. REV. STAT. § 1262 [P. P. C. § 42-1].
25

PROCEDURAL PROGRESS IN WASHINGTON

or paper in his possession, or under his control containing evidence
relating to the merits of the action or defense therein." This, too, looks
like a discovery procedure. However, it also was passed by the territorial legislature in 1854 and is subject to the restrictions mentioned
in relation to Remington 1226. In other words, it is not a device for
discovering what your opponent's case is about but is only an aid to
you in obtaining evidence which is necessary for the proof of your
own case.
The new rule, taken verbatim from the federal rule, authorizes the
court to order any party to produce and permit the inspection and
copying or photographing of any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, and in addition authorizes the court to order any party to
permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession
or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying or
photographing the property or any designated object or operation
thereon. The rule specifically states that the scope of the examination
permitted is the same as that permitted by Rule 26.
Rule 35. Prior to the promulgation of this rule we had a statute29
passed by the legislature in 1915, concerning physical examination of
parties. It was limited to actions for damages for personal injuries.
The present new rule is more comprehensive. It provides that in
any action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in
controversy the court may order a physical or mental examination. It
has some interesting provisions calculated to elicit full discovery of
the facts. Of course the party who is examined by the physician is
curious as to what the physician will say. He is entitled upon request
to a copy of the physician's report. However, if he exercises this privilege, the rule obliges him upon request to deliver to the other party
a like report of any examination previously or thereafter made of the
same mental or physical condition by other doctors. If he refuses to
deliver such report, the court on motion may make an order requiring
delivery on such terms as are just, and if a physician fails or refuses
to make such report the court may exclude his testimony. The rule
further provides that by requesting and obtaining a report of the examination the party examined waives any privilege he may have in that
action or any other involving the same controversy regarding the
testimony of every other person who has examined or may thereafter
examine him in respect of the same mental or physical condition.
29 REm.

REv. STAT. § 1230-1 [P. P. C. § 42-13].
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Rule 36. This rule, dealing with the admission of facts and genuineness of documents, is one of the few that our court had previously
adopted. It was old Rule 21. The present rule does nothing more than
to bring it up to date by including the 1946 amendment of the federal
rule.
Rule 37. This rule provides an arsenal of sanctions. Among other
things, refusal to make discovery may result in an order requiring
payment of expenses and attorneys' fees, an order adjudging one in
contempt of court, or an order for arrest. It may also result in an order
that the facts claimed by the proponent are deemed to be true, an
order restricting defenses or evidence, or orders striking pleadings,
staying proceedings, dismissing the action or rendering a default judgment.
The adoption of the federal discovery procedure by the new rules
is a great advance. It is regrettable that our court did not go one step
further and adopt federal Rule 56 dealing with summary judgments,
which provides in substance that either party to a suit may move
with or without affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor, and
that, if the court examines the complete files and finds there is no
real issue in the case, although an issue is made by the pleadings, he
may enter a summary judgment. The theory behind this procedure is
that although formal issues are made by the pleadings, there may be
no real issue about the facts of the case. A general denial may be interposed to a complaint, and then on the trial the defendant may not be
able to controvert any of the facts of the plaintiff's cause of action.
This often happens where an answer is put in merely to stall the case
along. Even where valid issues are made by the pleadings, it very often
happens that as a result of a diligent exercise of the discovery procedure it develops from the admissions and depositions in the file that
there is no real issue to be submitted to the jury. In such circumstances,
upon motion for a summary judgment, the case should end right there.
The federal rule gives the court the power to end the case there.
Unfortunately we have not adopted federal Rule 56, so our courts
continue to lack this authority." Our Rule 19, dealing with a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, is not a sufficient substitute. That rule
was probably adopted to overcome the result of the decision in State v.
Vinther.3" As I interpret the rule, one is entitled to judgment on the
30 See the excellent comment on summary judgments by JoAnn R. Locke in 25
WAsH. L. REV.

71 (1950).

31 183 Wash. 350, 48 P.(2d) 915 (1935), aff'd on rehearing, 186 Wash. 691, 58
P.(2d) 357 (1936).
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pleadings only when there is no material issue made by the pleadings.
Here we are contemplating a situation where there is an issue made
by the pleadings, but where as a result of the discovery process the
material in the files, including admissions and depositions, makes it
abundantly clear that the issue in the pleadings is a pure sham. Under
our present procedure the judge may not give a summary judgment.
Other Changes. When one has discussed the discovery process, he
has practically exhausted the significant changes in the rules of pleading, practice and procedure. A few minor changes are made here and
there aiming at simplification or clarification, and there are a few new
rules. Rule 39 deals with receivers. It does not purport to cover this
subject completely and must be construed with the other statutory
material regarding receivers and receiverships."
Rule 40 deals with jury fees. It, too, must be construed with other
statutory material regarding juries and jury fees.
Rule 41 provides that whenever a final report and petition for distribution, or either, shall have been filed in the estate of a decedent,
and a day fixed for the hearing of the same, the personal representative
shall cause to be mailed a copy of the notice of the time and place
fixed for the hearing to each heir or distributee whose name and
address is known to him and file proof of such mailing. This is a
correction of one of the supposed deficiencies in the probate code.
Rule 42, concerning the testimony of an adverse witness, apparently covers Remington 1228 to 1230 and incorporates in the rule part
of the statutory material concerning evidence.
Rule 43 is new and adopts verbatim federal rule 49 concerning
special verdicts and interrogatories. This is distinctly an improvement
over previous practice in this state. Formerly, although the trial
court had the discretionary power to submit special interrogatories
to the jury to be answered in connection with its general verdict, he
did not have the power to determine whether or not a special verdict
should be returned. 3 Our code made it discretionary with the jury,
which, of course, never chose to exercise it. Hence special verdicts
have been practically unknown. The new rule places the discretion
where it belongs-with the trial court. In many types of cases special
verdicts are far superior to general ones, and under the new rule we
may expect to see them used more frequently. Judge Driver's recent
articles on the subject will be most helpful to the bar."'
2

It merely supplements REm. REv. STAT. § 740 et seq. [P. P. C. § 91-1 et seq.].
38 Rrx. REv. STAT. § 364 [P. P. C. § 100-5].
34 Driver, A Consideration of the More Extended Use of the Special Verdict, 25
8
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GENERAL RULES OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS

Volume 34-A Washington Second also revises the General Rules of
the Superior Courts. The following table indicates the changes made:

Rule
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Source
Old rule 1
Old rule 2
Old rule 3
Old rule 4
Old rule 5
Old rule 6
Old rule 7
Old rule 8
Old rule 9
Old rule 10
Old rule 11
Old rule 12
Old rule 13
Old rule 14
Old rule 15
Remington 399
New
Old rule 17
Old rule 18
Old rule 19
Old rule 20
Old rule 21
Old rule 22
Old rule 23
Old rule 24
Old rule 25
Old rule 26
Old rule 27
Old rule 28
New
New

Degree of change,
if any
No change
No change
No change
No change
Substantial change
Slight change
No change
Slight change
No change
No change
No change
No change
Substantial change
No change
No change
Minor change
Major change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change
No change

WASH. L. REv. 43 (1950); Driver, The Special Verdict-Theory and Practice, 26
WASH. L. REv. 21 (1951).
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No change whatever has been made in twenty-three of the rules,
minor changes have been made in two, substantial changes have been
made in two, and four new rules have been added.
Rule 5. New Rule 5, dealing with divorce actions, differs from old
Rule 5 in that two matters are deleted. This is merely to make the
rule conform to the new divorce act.
Rule 13. This rule, dealing with proposed instructions to juries,
makes some minor changes in phraseology and then adds the following:
"Upon request of the trial judge, made not less than ten days before
the date of trial, counsel shall prepare and deliver to the trial judge
and to opposing counsel, not less than three days before the day on
which the case is set for trial, the required number of copies of proposed instructions insofar as counsel may then be able to determine
them."
Ride 16. There was nothing in the old rules comparable to new
Rule 16 which deals with new trials. All that Rule 16 does is to copy
verbatim Remington 399 as amended which sets forth the grounds
for new trial, and then the rule proceeds to add one additional ground,
No. 9, as follows: "that substantial justice has not been done." It
follows this by requiring the trial judge, upon granting or denying a
motion for a new trial, to give definite reasons of law and fact for
so doing.
Additional ground No. 9 was apparently added merely to declare
existing law and practice, since the Supreme Court for many years
has been committed to the proposition that the trial court may grant
a new trial on the ground that substantial justice has not been done,
even though this was not one of the grounds specified in the statute.
The provision in the new rule requiring the trial court to give
definite reasons of law and fact for either granting or denying a motion
for a new trial was apparently inserted to correct the situation which
was so eloquently discussed by Justice Hill in the case of Coppo v.
Van Wieringen.5 Justice Hill pointed out in that opinion that during
the course of the years the Supreme Court has taken the position that
if the trial court grants a new trial without assigning a reason or merely
on the ground that substantial justice has not been done, the Supreme
Court is powerless to review his action because of the intangible elements which may have influenced his judgment. This Justice Hill
deplores. Apparently it was thought that if the new rule required a
trial court to give definite reasons of law and fact for his action the
35 136 Wash. Dec. 110, 217 P.(2d) 294 (1950).
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appellate court would be in a better position to review the ruling and
determine whether or not it constituted an abuse of discretion.
Rule 17. This rule succinctly provides, "The trial court shall make
findings of fact in all equity cases, and in all law cases tried before the
court without a jury."
This changes the law insofar as equity cases are concerned. In a
long line of cases the Supreme Court has held that although the trial
court is not obliged to make findings of fact in equity cases yet, if it
does so they will be given great weight in the Supreme Court.3" This
rule now makes it obligatory upon the part of the trial court to make
findings of fact in equity cases.
Rule 30. This rule provides that when more than one year has elapsed
after the service of summons in a civil action the court shall not default
the defendant or enter judgment against him until a written notice of
the time and place of the application for such order is given to the
defendant and proof of such notice by affidavit duly made and filed.
This seems to be a salutary rule, and there are good reasons for it.
The courts are often used as collection agencies. After a suit has been
filed and summons served upon the defendant, in many cases the
defendant will make arrangements to pay the indebtedness perhaps
in instalments. He may be lulled into a sense of security in the belief
that as long as he keeps up his payments no judgment will be entered
against him. This rule is calculated to make it impossible for one to
take an unconscionable advantage of a defendant in such a situation.
Rule 31. This rule enlarges the powers of a visiting judge to consider
arguments, sign findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgments and
post-trial orders anywhere within the state. Whatever inconvenience
this rule may cause counsel is probably more than compensated for by
the convenience which it affords the visiting judge.
GENERAL COMMENTS

The late Justice Cardozo has said that "the considerations of policy
that dictate adherence to existing rules where substantive rights are
involved, apply with diminished force when it is a question of the law
of remedies." 37 Inadequate or defective rules of procedure should be
revised whenever their deficiencies become manifest. Procedural rules
are not an end in themselves. They are servitors of justice. If the ends
36 For recent representative cases, see Carey v. Powell, 32 Wn. (2d) 761, 204 P. (2d)
193 (1949) ; Osawa v. Onishi, 33 Wn.(2d) 546, 206 P.(2d) 498 (1949).
37 THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 156 (Oxford University Press, 1925).
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of justice may be better served by further amendments and additions,
they should be made without question. No system of procedure was
ever devised which did not need further modification and improvement.
One of the most thorough studies of procedure in this country was
made by the committee apointed by the U. S. Supreme Court, which
drafted the new rules of procedure for the federal courts. These were
adopted in 1938. Less than ten years later it became necessary to make
substantial amendments to these rules. It will undoubtedly be necessary to make further amendments in the future.
This all adds up to one thing: notwithstanding the really notable
accomplishments effected by our new rules, our task is not done. Procedural reform is a continuing process, and we must be alert, constantly
seeking a better way, if we are not to stagnate as did the common law
under the restrictive writ system. I do not suggest that procedural
rules should be kept in a constant state of flux, but 'sometime in the
future further revision of our rules is inevitable. I should like to point
out a few of the matters which I hope will receive consideration when
that time comes.
First, in regard to the rules on appeal, there is a modern tendency
to eliminate multiple jurisdictional requirements. 8 One of the maxims
of our Anglo-American tradition is that every man is entitled to his day
in court. In the past this has been interpreted as meaning his day in
the trial court. In the absence of constitutional guarantee, appeal is
not a matter of right and can be granted or withheld at the whim of
the lawmaking body." Until comparatively recently statutes and rules
regulating appeals set up numerous hurdles in the way of jurisdictional
steps. It was only the skillful practitioner who could successfully negotiate all of these hurdles and get his case heard on the merits in the
appellate court. Innumerable cases were thrown out upon technical
grounds for failure to comply with jurisdictional requirements. This
used to be true in the federal courts. The new federal rules adopted a
different attitude toward appeal. They made only one step jurisdictional, to wit, the giving of the notice of appeal. Rule 73 (a) provides,
"Failure of the appellant to take any of the further steps to secure the
review of the judgment appealed from does not affect the validity of
w ' have similar provisions. In the
the appeal." Illinois 40 and Michigan

8 SUNDERLAND,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRAmL AND APPELLATE PRAcricE

(2d ed., 1941).
s1 Bishop v. Illman, 9 Wn.(2d) 360, 115 P.(2d) 151 (1941).
40 ILL. ANN. STAT., 1936, c. 110, § 76 (2).
411939 Michigan Court Rules, Rule 56.
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present rules the Washington Supreme Court has softened the jurisdictional steps for appeal but has not cut them down to the desired
minimum. Especially is this true in regard to the jurisdictional necessity of the statement of facts. So much for the rules on appeal.
If it is desirable to have handily in one volume all of the rules
relating to appeal, I submit that it is equally desirable to have handily
in one volume all of the rules relating to practice in the superior
courts. The present rules do not make any attempt to so consolidate the
material. A reading of the rules of practice and procedure gives one
the impression that like Topsy they just grew. Their coverage is extremely heterogeneous. They deal mostly with civil actions in the
superior court. However, Rules 12 and 15 deal with criminal procedure.
Rule 5 deals with justice court procedure as well as with garnishment.
Rules 24 and 41 deal with probate, and Rule 39 deals with receivers.
Nor is there any attempt to cover any of these subjects completely.
Counsel must also consult the general rules of the superior courts and
the statutes, either Remington or Pierce, which do not always agree.
The general rules of the superior courts are also of a heterogeneous
nature. They cover mostly civil practice in the superior courts, but
Rules 11 and 27 deal with criminal practice, Rules 19 and 21 deal
with probate practice, and Rules 18 and 19 deal with receivers.
The coverage of the rules of practice and procedure and the general
rules of the superior courts is overlapping. The following subjects are
touched upon by both sets of rules: service of papers; amendments;
charge to the jury; findings and conclusions; criminal procedure;
motions; probate; evidence and witnesses; and receivers.
Why it is necessary to have two sets of rules, both dealing with the
same subject matter and both purporting to regulate procedure in the
superior courts, I am at a complete loss to understand. I can find no
logical reason why certain matters are governed by the rules of practice
and procedure, some by the general rules of the superior courts, others
are left to regulation by statute, and some are governed by all three.
We adopted our code of civil procedure in 1854, patterning it after
the New York code. Subsequent legislatures modified it from time to
time, making a change here and an amendment there. After the legislature delegated to the Supreme Court the rule-making power, it did
not entirely wash its hands of the whole subject of procedure in the
courts. In 1943 it enacted Chapter 206 which is solely and simply
a repealing statute. Perhaps the legislature felt that, since the Supreme
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Court had occupied the field, it would be a good idea to repeal some
of the outmoded sections of the code. This, of course, was unnecessary
since a rule which is in conflict with or supersedes a provision of the
code takes precedence over it. However, in Chapter 206 the legislature
repealed many pre-existing sections of the code, among which were
Remington 189, which defined necessary parties and contained the
usual code provision that one who would normally be a plaintiff but
who was unwilling to join might be made a defendant. This repeal left
us without such a provision, or for that matter any definition of who are
necessary parties. Chapter 206 also repealed Remington 339 which
outlined the manner and mode of conducting jury trials, the right to
open and close, opening statements, sequence of evidence and the
manner of instructing the jury. This repeal left us with a gap which is
only partially closed by Rule 8 of the rules of practice and procedure,
which is confined to the manner of instructing the jury and the closing
arguments of counsel.
Piecemeal reform is better than none, but it has its disadvantages.
Where a legislature or a court modifies a particular section of the code
or a rule and attempts to modernize it, strange results may be produced because modifications in other areas of procedure which may
be affected thereby are not considered. I would like to illustrate this
point by showing what has happened in Washington as a result of an
attempt to liberalize our procedure in regard to permissive joinder
of parties.
Under the common law which grew up in a nonindustrialized, noncommercial society under the stringent restrictions of the writ system,
there was no such thing as mere permissive joinder of plaintiffs or
defendants. Unless multiple parties were asserting or defending joint
rights they were not permitted to join or be joined. Today, in a highly
mechanized society where court dockets are crowded and time is at
a premium, we feel that it is desirable to shorten litigation. Where
several plaintiffs or several defendants, for that matter, are involved in
a transaction which results in litigation and where there are common
questions of law and fact which affect all of the parties, we feel it is
socially desirable to dispose of the whole matter in one suit rather than
in several, if that can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
parties. Hence the modern tendency is toward a very liberal policy of
permissive joinder of parties, plaintiffs, or defendants. To accomplish
this result, England liberalized its procedure in 1896 by adopting a
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rule4 2 to the effect that all persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly,
severally or in the alternative, where if such persons brought separate
actions any common question of law or fact would arise. The rule contains a proviso that if such joinder would embarrass or delay the trial
the court may order separate trials. The rule further provides a like
permissive joinder of parties defendant where there are common questions of law or fact. Many American states followed the lead of
England and revised their codes or adopted rules to accomplish the
same result. When the Washington Supreme Court promulgated its
first set of rules of practice and procedure in January of 1927, it
purported to carry out this reform by Rule 2. Curiously, the Court
copied the English rule verbatim as to permissive joinder of plaintiffs
but did not adopt the corresponding portion of the rule regarding
permissive joinder of defendants. I am unable to perceive any logical
reason why it would be socially desirable to provide for the one and
not the other.
While embracing the modern philosophy regarding permissive joinder
of plaintiffs, the Supreme Court did nothing toward liberalizing Remington 296 dealing with joinder of causes of action. This code section
is the old-fashoned type which says the plaintiff may unite several
causes of action in the same complaint when they all arise out of contract, etc., etc., giving eight different categories. It concludes with a
clause, "but the causes of action so united must affect all the parties
to the action ......

This type of provision was common in the early

codes before the present philosophy regarding liberal joinder of parties
emerged. One can see at a glance that if this code section remains in
force it will tend to emasculate the liberal provision of Rule 2 regarding permissive joinder of plaintiffs because almost by hypothesis the
several plaintiffs who unite for convenience are not similarly affected
by the causes of action which are joined. For instance, where two
plaintiffs who were injured in the same automobile accident join in
suing one defendant for personal injuries, each plaintiff is interested
in his own recovery and is not affected by nor interested in the recovery
of his co-plaintiff. As a matter of fact, our Supreme Court held, in
Koboski v. Cobb,43 that such a joinder is permissible. However in the
42
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Rules of the Sup. Ct., Order xvi, Rule 1 et seq.
161 Wash. 574, 297 Pac. 771 (1931).
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later case of Lamb v. Mason" there is dictum in the opinion which
casts doubt upon the validity of this type of joinder.
Even assuming that Rule 2 has pro tanto repealed Remington 296
as far as plaintiffs are concerned, since Rule 2 does not contain anything about permissive joinder of defendants, it cannot logically be
argued that Remington 296 is repealed as far as defendants are concerned. This presents an anomalous situation.
The same considerations of public policy which dictate that several
parties may join in the same suit where convenience can be served, and
where there are common questions of law or fact to be tried, also
dictate that all claims which one party has against another should be
united in the same complaint so that the sum total of the controversies
can be disposed of in one action. This is the position taken by the new
federal rules. If we are going to liberalize our rules regarding joinder of
parties, we should also liberalize our rules regarding joinder of causes
of action. The federal rule which permits unlimited joinder of causes
of action is federal Rule 18, subsection (a). Subsection (b) of federal
Rule 18 concerns a specialized type of situation where two causes of
action can be joined. Perhaps the framers of the rules thought this was
necessary because it constituted a departure from the former separation of law and equity in the federal courts. We have done a very
curious thing. By Rule 18 of our rules of practice and procedure we
have adopted the last half of federal Rule 18, which probably was
unnecessary in view of our code, and we have failed to adopt the first
half of federal Rule 18 which would have liberalized our law in regard
to joinder of causes of action.
These are matters for the future. In the meantime Washington
lawyers will be operating under improved and simplified rules relating
to appeals and they will be enjoying the benefits of the discovery
procedure.

4426 Wn.(2d) 879, 176 P.(2d) 342 (1947). Cf. Parrish v. Ash, 32 Wn.(2d) 637,
203 P.(2d) 330 (1949), noted in25 WASH.L. Rnv. 92 (1950).

